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ABSTRACT
This paperdevelops and employsafive-asset, four-household and
single-businesssector simulation model to measure the long-run impacts
of the major provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 on
the allocation of a fixed capital stock amongowner-occupied housing,
rentalhousing, and nonresidential capital. The specific provisions
analyzed are the increases in tax depreciation for nonresidential capital
and rental housing and the reduction in the maximum tax rate on unearned
income.
Our analysis suggests a 6 percentincreasein nonresidential capital,
an 11 percent decline in owner-occupied housing and little change in
rental housing (the increase in the number of renters-- thehomeownership rate declines by l percentage points --offsetsa decline in the quantity
of rental services demandedper renter). Inthe absence of an increase
in aggregate saving, real pretax interest rates rise by nearly two
percentagepoints. Corporate profit taxes decline by 60percent, and after-taxearnings rise by 25 percent. As a result of the Act, the net
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SOMEASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
Aboutfour years ago, Hendershott and Hu computed net (of depreciation)
user costs of capital for several types of nonfinancial capital:
producers durables and structures of both corporations and unincorporated
businesses, rental housing, and owner-occupied housing.1 Owing to differences
in taxation and financing, the net user costs were lower for housing
(especially owner-occupied) than for industrial capital. Moreover, the
spread between the user costs on industrial (especially corporate) and
residential (especially owner-occupied) capital had risen between the
middle 1960sand late 19708 inresponse to the increase in inflation.
The net result was obviously 'toverinvestment" in owner-occupied housing in
the 1970s, although the extent of this was tempered by downpayment and
cash-flow constraints and mortgage capital gains.2 The obvious economic,
although not political, solution to this misallocation problem wouldbeto
tax owner-occupied housing more heavily (e.g., tax imputed rents), thereby
raising its user cost relative to that of industrial capital.
HendershottandHu noted that the same effect on relative net user
costs could be achieved by taxing industrial capital less heavily;
instead of removing tax subsidies to housing, subsidies could be extended
to business capital, e.g., the employment of historic cost tax depreciation
while using accelerated depreciation schedules and allowing investment
tax credits. Businesses would bid for funds to finance capital expansion,
driving up real pretax interestrates andloweringthe demand for
residential capital. Infact, Hendershott and Hudescribed anarray
oftax changes that would tend to equate the net user costs for the six
capital goods they studied.2
The EconomicRecovery Tax Act of 1981 appears to be a major step
in this direction. The decrease in tax service lives for business capital
more than offsets the increase in the effective corporate tax rate
(at the current inflation rate) generated by historic cost depreciation
and LIFO inventory accounting. In addition, the cut in the maximum tax
rate on unearned income (and thus on equity cap±tal gains), the expansion
of IRA accounts and the eventual partial exclusion of interest income from
taxationsignificantly raises the attractiveness of investment in assets
other than owner-occupied housing.
The present paper develops and employs a simulation modeltomeasure
thelong-run impacts of the major provisions of the 1981 Tax Act on the
allocation of a fixed capital stock among owner-occupiedhousing, rental
housing, and nonresidential capital.3 We emphasize the word allocation
because aggregate savings is implicitly assumed to equal replacement
investment in residential and nonresidential capital. Macroeconomic
impacts(reduced unemployment of resources) andgrowtheffects (greater
labor supply and saving) are not ex.m1,ied.The specific tax changes
analyzed are the increases in tax depreciation for nonresidential capital
and rental housing and the reduction in the maximum tax rate on unearned
income.2a
The paper is divided into five sections. Sections I and II describe
thegeneral form ofthe aimilationmodel andits initial parazneterization,
respectively. Theequations explaining tenure choice andthedemandsfor
housing servicesfrcm owner-occupied andrentalhousingservicesare
discussedin more detailinSection III. SectionIVcontains the simulation
results,andSection V sunrs.rizea andqualifiesthe results.
I.The Model
Our description of the model is presented in six brief parts. The
firsttwo discuss thedetermination of nonresidential capital and output
andthe specification of the demands for housing services.The householdcategories
and their asset demandsare described in parts threeandfour •Government
spending andtaxes are thetopics of part five, andthemodel is stmnrized
inpart six.
Nonresidential Capital and Output
Our economy contains two goods, housing and nonhousing. The nonhousing




where Y is the level of nonhousing output; L is the labor force; and K is
the quantity of nonresidential capital employed which is determined by
equating the value of its marginal product to its user cost. Thus,
(2) K = '3
where is the user cost of nonresidential capital.
Corporations finance their capital by issuing risk-free debt (the interest
on which is taxed at the personal level), ATX, and risky equity, AEQ. We
TX EQ assume that average q is unity (A + A =K)and that the fraction b of. corporate
capital is debt financed. Finally, the user cost for corporate capital depends on
theyields corporations pay on debt Rtx and equity Rk, the expected inflation
rate IT,thecorporate tax rate ¶,and.any specialtax treatment of corporations,
denoted by
(3)Ckck(Rtx, Rk, ,T,xk).
The precise form of (3)Ispresented in Hendershott and Hu (1981a).
TheDeaand.aforHousingServices
Housing services are producedwithhousingcapitalonl,y, andthe
services are measured such that one unitofcapitalproducesone unitof
services. The dernds fortheseservices depend on real after-tax labor
income and therealuser cost ofcapital, Assume thathouseholdsfaU
into ! incomeclasses.The demandforhousingservicesby households
in the jth classthat are homeowners is
(Ii.) -(7) AHAr(COhOY, coj)
where4isthe aggregate after-tax real labor income of householda in. this
class, o is the fraction of households in the class thatare owners,and





TheO'g axe scale factorsrelatingtothe share of incomeallocatedto
housingconsumption.
There are six equations relating real user costs for housing to yields
on debt (mortgages) and own equity financing and tax variables. For owners,
there are relationsforeach class,dependingon their personal tax rates
(12)—(15)COj co(RohRtx, ii,es).
whereRoh isthe cost of own equity financingbyhouseholds in the jth class.
Forrental housing,therearerelationsforeachof the two householdclasseà
that invest inrental housing, even though there is a singleusercost or
rentalrate paid by renters:
(16)- (17)or cr(Rrh Rtx, iT,0,x5,
wherereflects the special tax factors relatedto rental housing.




There arefour income classes, part of each which owns their own house
and part of which rents housing. This gives a total of eight categories.5
The incomes and marginal and average tax rates for the four income classes
are listed in the tap half of Table 1. The after-tax labor incomes can




where Z equalsone if the household isan ownerandzero if it is a renter.
Notethat (1_k)LjYis theagegate before-tax labor incomeofthe ith
income class.
Theassets held by the various sectors are listed in the lower panel
of the table.Notethat the fraction of each income class that isanowner-
occupied rises monotonically with income from 0.149 to 0.90. Also, only
the two highest income classes hold tax-exempt bonds and rental housing.
Finally, households finance investment in residential capital (owner-
occupied and rental) with debt and awn-equity, in fractions v and 1-v.
Risk Premiums, Asset Demands and rket Clearing
Financial markets adjust such that after-tax, risk-adjusted returns




whereRtx is the risk-freerateandpi and 8i,, respectively, are the
riskpremium andthetax rate applied to the incomeearnedon the ith
asset required or held by the jth investor•Weassume thateachrisk premium
is the productof the commonriskaversion parameter V,the expected
after-taxvariance of the return, and.the proportion of the household's
wealthinvested in the asset6
TABLE 1:INCOME, TAXES AND ASSETS OF HOUSEHOLD CLASSES
Income Range
(1977 $ in thousands) 0 -10 10 -25 25 -50 50
IflC,,meandTaxes
Before-tax Income (y) 8 19 37.5 60
Fraction of Households
in class (h.) 0.39 0.44 0.10 0.07
Fraction of Labor
Endowment in
class (L) 0.15 0.41 0.18 0.26
Marginal tax rate (e.) 0.15 0.22 0.35 0.50
Average tax rate (G.) 0.015 0.099 0.166 0.248










Owner-Occupied Housing (o.) 0.49 0.70 0.86
. 0.90
a) =h1y/Eh.y
Sources:U.S. AnnualHousingSurveyandStandard Federal Tax Reporter.7
(b) pi =v(i-ei)2i
Substituting (a) into (b) and solving for the portfolio shares, we write
twenty general demand equations for equities (8),tax-exempts(Ii), rental





Following Hend.ershott and Hu (i981a),theafter-tax equity returns to
shareholders are given by
(50) -(53)ik =-+ (i-v)]$)Rk+
where'isthe portion of real earnings paid out andis the ratio of
the concurrent effective capital gains tax rate to the incometax rate.






where v, again, is the loan-to-value ratio on residential housing. Finally, there
are market-clearing equations for the markets for taxable debt (bonds and mortgages),
equities, tax-exempt securities, and rental housing (there is no equation for
owner-occupied housing because supply and demand are necessarily equal at all
times):




The volumes of outstanding stateand local tax-exempt debt (EX) andfederal
debt (FED)are treated as exogenous, and both are assumed to have financed
governmentinvestment.
Taxes and theGovernment
Nineequations are introduced to compute taxes by household class







wherediv =V(1og = and r =or-vRtx-- taxdepr. The
three terms reflect capital gains taxes (p. is the ratio -- assumedto be
0.133 --ofthe average concurrent effective capital gains tax rate to 8),
property taxes (iisthe property tax rate--0.018),and Federal income
taxes. Regarding div and cg, EAT is corporate earnings after taxes, RE is
corporate retained earnings, and =o.4) is the proportion of real earnings
paid out. An exception arises for the highest income category. For these
groups (both owners and renters), the average tax rate was applied to labor
income only. For renters,was otherwise replaced by an average of 0.6 and
e(0.5);for owners, 0.55 and were averaged. That is, wiearned income is
assumed to be taxed at a higher rate than labor income and the rate is
higherforrenters, who donothaveexpenseson owner—occupied housing
toitemize, than for owners.
Total household taxes are computed by aggregating across households:
(74) TX=￿TXH9
Corporatetaxes and income arealso computedendogenously. For taxes,
wehave
(7) TXK - + bRtx+
+ ¶K(.6) - .00liK(.6),
whereiisthe statuatory corporate tax rate (0.52 which reflects state,
as well as Federal, taxes),6tx
is effective rate of tax depreciation,5
andis the corporate property tax rate (0.012). Thelastterm isa
crudeattempt at incorporating the investment tax credit. The 0.6 factor
is the ratio of gross corporate product to total GNP net of housing
services (Y); the 0.65 factor is the ratio of plant and equipment to total
capital (including land and inventories).The lasttwo model equations




Government spending is assumed to equal taxes paid by households
and businesses. A tttrue tax cut --onethat does more than offset
bracket creap due to inflation --then,is assumed to be "financed" by
budget cuts elsewhere. This seems realistic in the current (1981-82)10
setting.Itis, of course, possible to simulatesimultaneousincreases
insome taxesanddecreases in others.
del Summary
The modelequationsaresummarized by market in Table 2. In addition
tothefive asset markets, a "market" for nonresidential capital and output
is listed. The equations for each market are divided into demand, supply,
and "returns". ThelatterIncludes: market-clearing equations, user—cost
expressions, and relations for household specific after-tax returns on
residential capital andcorporateequity. To clarifymatters,symbols for
the return variables are listed. In addition to the 53marketequations,
12 expressions for tenure choice and after-tax labor incomes and 12 tLtax
equationswere specified above.
II.Parameterization of the Model
The exogenous variables in the model are the following:
a)risk parameters: V and O2'S for the four risky assets
b)inflation and debt ratios: i, b and v
c)wealth and laborIncomedistribution endowments: the w and
d)production parameters: 0'k' oh' andrh
e)tax parameters: ,xk,xh,9 and
r)other:W, L, TEX and FED.
Becausethe last year ofavailable income tax datais 1977, themodel
has beenparameterized for this year. The £, e1 and are coixuted
fromthisdata (seeTable 1). The othertax parameters are described in
Hendershott and Hu (l981a) and Hendershott and Shilling (1981). We setU
TABLE 2: THE MODEL EQUATIONS BY MARKET
Demand Supply Returns Total
Taxable Debt 8 Rtx 9
Equities 8 Rk, Rk
Tax Exempt Bonds 4 Rex 5
RentalHousing 4 4 Rrh3,Rrh4,cr
11
Owner-Occupied
Housing 4 co., Roh 12
Business Capital
andOutput 1 1 Ck
Total 29 5 19 53
a)The 3 and 4 subscripts on Rrh denote the two highest (3 and 4) income classes.12
ii =0.06,U=$5715biflion, TEX$2214billion, FED =$350billion,
V =3,b =0.333,and v =08.W, TEX, and FED are 1977 values from
FederalReserve flowoffunds data; TIisour best guess on 1977expected
inflation;V isacommon risk aversion parameter ofno real importbecause
Voi2is what matters so a set of oi2's can be selected to be consistent
with any value of V; and b and v are the fractions of marginal investments
in nonresidential and residential capital that appear to be debt financed.
The remaining variables --thefour 'i e5fourw s, three'8,andL --
areset such that an array of endogenous variables would be initialized
at their observed 1977 values.Thisarray includes, Y, K, ￿AOR,£J,
Rtx, Rex, or, andthefourcoh's. The 1977 values of these variables
were:Y =$1784billion,K =$3006billion,ZA =$523billion,
LAOH =$1613billion, T $80.7 billion, Rtx =0.08,Rex =0.0560,
cr .091, Co1 =.0933,002.0568, 003 =.0283,and. 0%=.0189.6
The latter five variablesarenotobserved butwere constructedand
utilizedin the estimation of demands for housing services (see the following
section). In effect, the simulation model was coded with these quantities,
yields, and user costs asexogenous and solved for the cYi2's,the w's,
the 's and L. The solutions were13
=0.0384,c =0.014148, =0.0635and o 0.08214
0.126, w2 =0.1437,w3 =0.217andw14 =0.220
0.29,cYrh =0.0829,COh =0.0586and L 114.142 billion.
When the w1 are compared with theh1, we find that the $l0-25 thousand
income class has about its shareofwealth, the $25-50 class has twice
as much wealth per household, and theover$50classhas three times as
much wealthper household. When the WI are compared with thethe
highest and lowest income groupsareseen to have relatively lowwealth/labor-
incomeratios.
The simulationsthatproduced the above variables also generated full
balance sheets forthe eight household sectors. Thedollar values of these
balancesheets and the ratios of assets to net worth (where mortgage
debt is treated as a negative asset) are listed in Tables 3 and 14.Note
that the share of wealth In risk-free debt (eithet,grossor net of nrtgage debt)
declines as income rises, while the shares in everything else rise with income.
The computed values of EAT and RE are, in billions of dollars,
614.5 and 214.3. The observed 1977 values for EAT and RE were 67.1 and 25.5,
quite close to those simulated. (These values are corrected for the
CommerceDepartment 'a inventory valuation andcapital consumption
adjustments.)
Theinitialvalues for the household specific after-tax rates of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABlE 5:HOUSEHOLD SPECTh'ICAFTER-TAX RETURNS
Incne Range
(1977 $inthousands) 0-10 10-25 25-50 50+
Equities (Bka) .1063 .iO1O .0997 .0932
Owner-Occupied Housing (Roh) .1062 .0991 .0928 .0928
RentalHousing (Rrh) --- .09 .1016
III.The Demands for Housing Services
The specification of the demand for housing services and the rental-
ownership tenure choice deals simultaneously with the discrete and continuous
aspects of housing decisions. Following King (1981), we posit a translog





where and y-, respectively, are the price of housing services and
nominal after-tax labor income for a household in the jth class, P
is the price of the composite commodity, the are positive constants,
and reflects the effects of the idiosyncracies in tastes of the
household. Except for these idiosyncracies, the households within our
four income classes are identical.
The individual household is assumed to makethetenure choice that
maximizes its utility. Assuming the stochastic utility components, the
are independently and identically distributed with a double-exponential
distribution, the logarithm of the odds of households in the jth class
choosing to own rather than rent is
=6lS21og() -B1B21ogCoj)2 -(logcr)2
where co and cr equal P/P°, depending on whether the household owns or
rents. (These c's are generally referred to as real user costs.) This
expression is known as the logit probability model [for more details
see Domeneich and Mcadden (1975)].
The data on the probability of homeownership are taken from the Annual
HousingSurveyfor the years1973to 1979. This study analyzes the tenure
choicedecision for households over time by real income groups. The
definitionsand breakdown of the classesare 0-3,000,3,000-,000,14,000-5,000,17
5,000-6,000,6,000-7,000,7,000-10,000, 10,000-15,000, 15,000-25,000
and over 25,000. Tile probability,o, that a household in income c].ass
j will choose to own is approximated by the ratio of the munber of
homeowners to the number of households in that income class.




CUjis the unconstrained real user cost,
mjis a mortgage-property
tax payment constraintvariable, and cv is a parametertobe estimated.
Themortgage-propertytax payment constraintvariable, mj attempts to
capture the extent to which financing costs and propertytaxes impinge
upon the buyer 's liquidity.Thevalue of
mjis based on net-of-tax
mortgage. andproperty taxpayments on a dollar of housing, assuming 75
percentdebt financingatthe mortgageratefor the relevant year, times
theratio of a 19711.constant-qualityhouse to mean household disposable
real income. The value of a' is determined in the estimation.
Theconstruction of the unconstrained user costs of owning byincome
classfollows Hendershott andHu(1981c).The data employedin the calculation
of CUj areidenticalto thatusedin Hendershott and Hu with the exception
thattherequired after-tax return on equity fortaxpayers withlowto
mediummarginal tax rates isthe after-tax mortgagerateplus a three
percentage point risk premiumand for taxpayersin higher taxbrackets
the required after-taxreturn on equity is taken to be the tax-exempt
rateplus the risk premium.718
The calculation of the user cost of capital of rental housing
utilized in the analysis is an extension of that described in Hendershott
and Shilling (1981). The extension consists of viewing theaptimal behavior
of art investor in rental housing as: 1) investing In rentalhousing until
the marginal product of capital equals the usercost, and 2) choosing an
optimalholdingperiod in order to maximize wealth. The basis for determining
the real user cost of capital of rental housing thendepends on maximizing
the present value ofall future expected cash flows generated over the
optimal holding period of the property or equivalentlyminimizing the
user cost of capital with respect to the optimal holding period.
Thebest estimate of the ].ogit probability model using a pooled






wheret-statistics are shownin parentheses. Both coefficients have the
expected sign and are significantly greater than zero at the 95 percent
confidence level. The effect of the impact of credit market constraints
(nominal interest rates) and property tax payments on the prices of owner-
occupied housing services diminished as incomeincreasedand wasassumed
not to bind households in the highest income groups.Inthe modelsimulations,
cis set equal to zero.
The demand for housing services can be derived by applyingRoy's
identity tothe indirect utility function. The demand forhousingservices
by households in the jth class that are homeowners is19
a
AH = Ce l2+2B log COj]
el_PCOJ






The scale parameter B1 is determined in the initial parameterization such
that the sumofhousehold demands for housing services equals the existing
housingstock.Different scale parameters are allowed for the owner and
rentalmarkets.More specifically, 1/B1 equals 0'oh in the AH equations
and rh in the RH equations.
The implied price elasticities of the demandforowner-occupied
and rental housing services are listed in Table 6 for 1976. Also listed
is the weighted average of the price elasticities for owner-occupied
housing. These results can becomparedwith Polinsky and Elwood (1979),
whoreport an elasticity of -0.7, and Hanushek and Quigley (1980), who
estimate an elasticity of -0.i.
IV.Some ImpactsofThe 1981Tax Act
Thelong-run impacts ofthe various tax changes considered on the
allocation of a fixed aggregatecapitalstock canbeillustrated in Figure 1.
The risk-free taxable debt rate is on the vertical axis andthequantity of
capital is on the horizontal. The first schedule is the aggregate demand
for owner-occupied housing. While this schedule is drawn for given values
of a large set of exogenous variables, the only one listed is the marginal
taxrateon 'unearned"income ofthe highest income class, e.(An
increasein 8, ceteris paribus, will lower the user cost for owner-20
TABlE6:PRICEElASTICITIESOF DEMA FOR































































































































































occupiedhousingofthe highest income households.) This demand schedule
(all capital demand schedules) is negatively related to the taxable debt rate
because an increase in this rate, ceteris paribus, will raise the real user
cost for housing for all income classes.
The second schedule is the sumofthe aggregate demands for owner-
occupied andrentalhousing.Thisschedule is drawn for a given level of
taxation of rental housing, xh,aswell as a given value of e. An increase
in xh raises the user cost for rental housing andthusshifts the IES(=Ao'÷A)
schedule to the left. Thetotalcapital schedule is drawn for given levels
of e,xh,and xk, the level of taxation of nonresidential capital. An
increaseinxh shifts RES and CAP(=RES+K)equally to the left,the latter
becauseofthe former. An increase in shifts only CAP to the left.
Now consider the recently passed reduction in the tax service lives of
business capital. Both xk and are reduced, although the latter by
8
less thantheformer. As a result, RES shifts slightly to the right,
and CAP shiftsstronglyto the right. Theincreased financing needs
raisethe yield on taxable debt (and yields on other assets throughportfolio
substitutioneffects). This will lower the demand for owner-occupied
housing per owning unitandwill likelyreducethe numberofowners (see
below).The demandfor nonresidential capital will certainlyrise. The
impacton rental housing is ambiguous. Given the small reduction in the
taxationof rental housing relative to the significant risein interest
rates,the user cost of rental housing will likelyrise,lowering the demand
per renting unit. On the other hand, the user cost of rental housing
will likelyfallrelative tothatof owner-occupied housing,causinga
shift in tenure tord rental housing.22a
We wish to emphasize the strong assumption employed here that total
saving is unaffected by the cut in tax depreciation. Not only do households
not increase their saving in response to the increase in real rates of
return, but they fully offset the increase in business saving (retained
earnings). That is, households fully 'pierce the corporate veil." We
wouldanticipatea significant increase in total private saving and
thus a dampeningofthe tendency for interest rates to increase. Ignoring
the saving response allows us to concentrate on the allocative effects
of the tax changes.
The impact of a reduction in the taxation of' rental housing only seemn
clear. While this reduction, too, will raise interest rates, the user cost
of rental housing will fall, while those of owner-occupied housing and
nonresidential capital will rise. There will be less owner-occupied
housing, owing to both lower demand per unit and fewer owning units, and
less nonresidential capital.
Because a reduction in lowersthedemands for owner-occupied
housing, rental housing and nonresidential capital -- allschedules shift
to the left with the shift being greater for RES than for AOH and for CAP
than for RES. Interest rates will decline sufficiently to maintain total
demand for capital equal to the given stock. Unfortunately, the directional
impacts on the specific capital components cannot be ascertained from
Figure 1. This would, of course, lead one to suspect that these impacts
are not large.
Our presentation of the simulation results of the Tax Act is divided
into four parts in order to Illustrate both the impacts of the different
tax changes and the workings of the model. The first three parts deduce23
the separate impacts of the increase in tax depreciation of nonresidential
capital,the reductioninmaximum taxrate on unearnedincome, andthe
increase in tax depreciation of rental housing. The fourth part computes
the combined impact of these three changes.
Increase in Tax Depreciation of Nonresidential Capital
The simulation results reported in Tables 6 and 7 reflect the impact
of a shortening of tax service lives of corporate capital (an increase
in tax depreciation). More specifically, we lowered the real user cost
of corporate capital exogenaus].y so as to reflect passage of Jones-Conable
or the 10-5-3 depreciation tax lives. In earlier work,Sheng Huand I
calculated that this legislation would lower the real user cost,
ceteris paribus, by 1 percentage points (Hendershott and Hu, 1981b, p. 99).
While a 15-5-3 depreciation schedule is less valuable to businesses than
10-5-3,theEconomicRecovery Tax Act hassome tax reduction features in addition
to the cut in the tax services lives. For example, the investment tax credit
for equipment was broadened, the credit being roughly doubled for equipment
with a useful life under 7 years •Thecredit was also expanded to cover
facilities used for storage of petroleum and its primary products, and
the carryback period was extended to 15 years. In any event, we have
simply lowered the tax depreciation component of the real user cost by
14. percentage points.Finally, itshould be noted that this analysis, like
any employing the Jorgensonian user cost framework,assumesfull lease-back
provisions, i •e•,thetax cuts apply to all potential investments,
independent of whether the particular companies are or are not currently
earning profits.2L
TABLE 7: THE IMPACT REAL EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN
TAX DEPRECIATION FOR NRESIDENTIAL CAPITAL
Real User 08ta guantity
Initial A Initialt
Capital:
Nonresidential 17.21 -.691i 3005.8178.26
Owner-OccupiedHouaing 3.961.29 33 1613.0-147.0.9
RentalHousing 9.101.6218 523.1 -31.2 -6
Output, TaxesandEarnings:




Household Taxes 231.2 1.81
8tJser costs are measured in percentage points; that for owner-occupied housing
isa weightedaverage of those for the four householdclasses, the weights
beingtheir fraction of the initial stock held. Dollar magnitudes are in
billions of 1977 dollars.25
TABLE 8: THE PORTFOLIO CTS OF AN flREASEIN




Equities .06 .111. .29 .52
Owner-Occupied Housing -.21-.39-.44 -.26
Rental Housing 54 .19
Tax-Exenxpts -.21 .21
Percentage ChangesinHoldings
Equities 2 3 6 8
Owner-OccupiedHousing -8 -12 -12 -4
Rental Housing _il+ 3
Tax-Exempts -53 10
Debt 0 -1 1
aMeas.ed inpercentagepoints. Thespreadsaretheafter-tax yieldson the listedasset less (1-81)Rtx, the after-tax yield on debt instruments.26
The upper half of Table 6 indicates the impact on the real user costs
andquantities of the three types of capital. Thetaxable debt yield
risesby 2.11 percentage points in order to restrain the total demandfor
capital to the existing stock. As a result, the real user cost for
nonresidentialcapital declines byonly a thirdofa percentage point,
andthose for housing rise by 1.3 to 1.6 percentage points. Nonresidential
capital increases by 6 percent, owner-occupied housing decreases by 9
percent, and rental housing is lowered by 6 percent.3
Not surprisingly,thistax changehas amajor impact on corporate
taxes and earnings (see the lower halfof Table 6). Total corporate
taxesdecline by 112percent.Because propertytaxesrise slightly
(from$21.6 billion to $22.9 billion),profit taxes are estimated to drop
bya full 60percent.Earnings after taxes rise by 25 percent and retained
earnings, by 36percent.The impact onhousehold taxes is negligible.
Nextwe turntotheportfolio effects of the increase in tax depreciation.
The initial effect ofthe increase is a decline in the real user cost for
nonresidentialcapital and an increase in the return on corporate equity.
Because households shift from debt instruments to equities and corporations
issuedebt (and equity) to finance theirgreater investment, the yield.
ontaxable debt rises. This renders tax exempts and both owner-occupied27
andrentalhousing less attractive, the latter because they are heavily
debt financed. Changesinthe after-tax yield spreads required to establish
the new equilibrium are presented in the top half of Table 8. These are
changesin the after-tax yields onthe listed asset less thatondebt
instruments,and the net changes vary by income class (the investor's
tax bracket).As canbe seen, equities aremore,and owner-occupied
housingless, attractive for all income classes. Rental housing and. tax-exempts
are also less attractive forthose in the $25-50thousand incomegroup,
but more attractive for those with higher incomes. Of course, tax exempts
cannotbecome less attractive for all investors because the exogenous
stock xmist be held by someone.
The percentage changesin assetholdingsare listed in the lower
halfof the table. These changescorrelateclosely with the changes in
after-tax yield spreads. The higher the income class, the greater the
shift into equities. Also, the twomiddle incomegroups, which experience
the greater declines in the relative return on owner-occupied housing,
reducetheir holdingsbygreater amounts. These groupsreducetheir
homeownership rates by just over a percentage point; the other twogroups
havenegligible changesin ownership.
The $25-SOthousand group also shifts out ofexempts and rental housing,
thelatter shift being over 50 percent. While the ratio of the exempt
to taxable debt yields declines from 0.70 to 0.67, the spread between the
exempt and after-tax taxable debt yield rises for those in the highest
tax group. The net yield on rental housing also rises for this group.
The dollar movement into equities and out of housing and exempts is about
a wash for the three lower income groups, so changes in their debt holdings28
are minor. The highestincome group, whichshifts into rental housing and
exempts as well as into equities, liquidates hO percent of its debt holdings.
Reduction in the Maximum Tax Rate on Unearned Income
The Tax Act lowers the maximum tax rate on unearned income from 70
to 50 percent. We assume that this translates into a reduction in the
average marginal tax rate for owners in the highest income class from
55 to 50 percent. For the tenth for the higher income class that rents,
the reduction is from 60 to 50 percent. The average tax rates on capital
income fall from 52.5 to 50 and 55to50, respectively.
The initial impact of this tax cut is on the highest income group
only; taxable debt instruments become more attractive and all other assets
relatively less attractive, housing investments owing to the reduced
tax saving on interest deductions. As a result, the taxable debt yield
declines. This induces all other household groups to shift out of debt
instruments and into the other assets. The necessary change in the debt
yield required to achieve the new equilibrium is small, however (a decline
of21 basispoints),and thusthe impact on capital allocation is minor.
Owner-occupied housing increases by $1.5billion, and rental housing and
nonresidential capital decrease by $0.3 and $1.2 billion, respectively.
Nonetheless,some quite significant portfolio shiftsoccur. Table 9
presents the dollar value changes in asset holdings; mortgage debt (which
equals 80 percent of housing)is treated asa negative asset in order that
theassetchanges sum to zero. To put these changes in perspective, the
percentage changes in holdings of equities are, from the lowest to the
highest income groups: 6,5,h and -9.Forholdings of taxable debt,29
TABLE9:THEIMPACT OFA REDUCTIONIN THEMP.XIMUM
TAXRATE ON IJHEARNED INCOMES
IncomeClass
0-10 10-25 25-50 > 50 Total
Balance Sheets
Equities io.i 35.2 17.2 -63.3 -0.8
Tax-Exempts - - 20.1 -20.1 -
Owner-OccupiedHousing27 12.7 6.5 -20.4 1.5
Rental Housing - - 26.7 -27.0 -0.3
Taxable Debt -10.6 -37. -14.4.0 92.9 0.6
-Mortgages -2.2 -10.2 -26.5 37.9 -1.0
0 0 0 0 0
OwnershipRate 1.6 0.6 0.4 -1.5 0.5
Taxes 0.0 -0.3 0.1 2.0 1.8
Memo: Levelof Wealth 720 2500 1240 1256 5716
aOwnership rates areinpercentage points; dollar magnitudes are in billions
of 1977dollars.30
thechanges are: -2, -2, —7, and 16. The net indebtedness of the highest
income group (mortgage debt less holdings of taxable debt) falls by
3]. percent. There are also significant shifts in holdings of tax-exempts
and rental housing from the highest income group to the $25-50 thousand
group. (The ratio of the exempt rate to the taxable debt rate rises from
0.7to 0.73.) These portfolio shifts also include owner-occupied housing,
withthe highest income group lowering itshomeownership rate by l-
percentagepoints and the lowest income group doing the reverse.
Thelastinteresting finding is the change in household taxes.
The cut in the tax rate on f'ul].y-taxed debt leads the highest income
group to shift from riskier, tax-sheltered investments into the more
heavilytaxed debt instruments. Asa result, their taxes rise by over
$2billion. Because the decline in taxes paid by other households is
slight, total household taxes rise. A miniature Laffer curve exists, even
withoutgreater workeffort.
Increasein the Tax Depreciation on Rental Housing
TheTax Act reduced the tax service life on rental housing from
35 to15 years. As a partial offset, the depreciation method wasreduced
from double declining balance to 175 percent declining balance. On the
one hand, this action will lower the rental user cost, thereby altering
the tenure mode towardrenting and increasingthe desired rental quantity
per renting unit.Thedemand forrentalservices will rise. On the other
hand, the expected return on investments in rental property will increase,
raisingthesupplyofrental housing services. A partial equilibrium
analysis could viewthe response fromeither side of the market; a general31
equilibriumanalysis incorporates both responses and constrains the market
for rental services to clear in the new equilibrium. We shall use this
disturbance (reduced taxation of rental housing) to illustrate the
different estimates of impactsobtainedwhen different variables are
treated as endogenous.
Inthe firstcase, only the returns on and the portfolio demands
forrental housing areendogenous.As canbeseen in Table 10, the result
is a $1311.7billion,or 25 percent,increase in the stock ofrental
housing.Supposedlythe demand for rental housing services rises
sympathetically aridthe stock of owner-occupied housing fallsby an equal
amount.
Thesecond case considers the demands for rental housing services
explicitly.When the returns to rentalhousing are held constant, the
realuser cost falls by a full percentage point. With ownership rates
exogenous [see case (2a) in Table 10], consumption demand rises by $40
billion. With endogenous ownership rate8 [see case(2b)], the demand
increasesby $133.4billion,which is remarkably (and only coincidentally)
close to the $134.7billionincrease in portfolio demand in the first case.
The average ownership rate falls by a full 5percentagepoints. However,
ourdemand equationsfor owner-occupied housingsuggestthatthetotal
residentialhousingstockrises by $50billion. Thus, the stock of
nonresidentialcapital implicitly falls by this amount.
Finally,we have thefull modelor general equilibrium analysis
[see case (3) in Table ioJ. The rental user cost falls and the return on
rental housing rises (at least for the highest income group). The supply































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Inthe rental user cost and ownership rate andtheincrease In the stock
of rental housingareonly a third as large as in the partial equilibrium
cases. The stock of rental housingrisesby 8 percent. About 80 percent
of the increase is at the expense of owner-occupied capital and20percent,
nonresidential capital.
The CombinedImpact ofthe Tax Act of 1981
Theresults of combining the three components of the Tax Act are listed
inTable 11.The major results of Table 7-- the6percentrise in
nonresidentialcapital and the sharpincreasesIn business after-tax
earnings andretentions--arerepeated.One significant difference
isthat theincrease in nonresidentialcapital is almost entirely at the
expense of owner-occupied housing. The ownership rate falls by over a
percentage point, and the stock of owner-occupied housing decreases by
II percent. In contrast, rental housing Is reduced by less than one percent.
Of course, this result could have been expected given the analysis of the
increase in taxdepreciationfor rental housing.
The portfolio shifts shown In Table U are a mixtureofthose
indicated In Tables 8and9.Toillustrate, the business tax cut raised
equity holdingsofthe highest twoincomeclasses significantly, while the
cut in the taxonunearned Income caused the$25-50 thousand group to
increaseequity holdingsbut the over $50thousand group tolower them
sharply. Thus Table 11 shows a large Increase in equity holdings of the
former anda smalldecreasefor thelatter.Further,Table 8listsa shift
inboth tax-exempts andrentalhousing from the $25-SO thousand groupto31





Equities ii+.6 611.7 117.6 -7.5119)4 6
Tax-Exempts - - 5.7 -5.7 -
OwnerHousing 9.6 611.o-li.i.6 -60.2-175)4 _11
Rental Housing - - -17.0 13.3 -3.7 -1
TaxableDebt -12.7 -51.9_lii.6 22.6-83.6 -3
-Mortgages 7.7 51.2 116.9 37.5 1113.3 -8
0 0 0 0 0
Ownership Rate -0.7 -1.7 -1)4 -2.1 -1.3
Taxes 0.0 2.6 -0.2 -1.3 1.1
Memo: Levelof Wealth 720 2500 1211.0 1256 5716
Nonresidential Business:
Initial Change
Capital 3005.8 179.1 6
Output 17814.7 30.2 2
Taxes 80.7 -33.1 -141
EarningsAfterTaxes 214.3 9.1 38
Retained Earnings 614. 16.7 26
Taxable Debt Rate 8.00 1.85 23
Ownerehip rates and interest rates are in percentage points; dollar magnitudes are
in billions of 1977 dollars.35
thosewith higher incomes; Table 9showsthe reverse. Thus the shifts
in Table 11 are quite small. Also, recall thatratioof the yields on
taxexempt andtaxable debt was lowered to 0.67bythe increase in business
taxdepreciationbut raised to 0.73 by the cut in tax on unearned income.
When the two tax changes are combined, the ratio is unchanged.
Table 12 lists the net (of depreciation) user costs of capital for
corporate capital, rental housing, owner-occupied housing on average,
and the components of the latter. The initial net user costs and those
after the impact of the Tax Act are reported. Ignoring risk considerations
and possible externalities, the net user costs should be equal across
all types of capital for capital to be allocated efficiently in the economy.
The Tax Act goes a fair distance toward achieving this equality. Prior
to the Act, the net user cost for corporate capital was 2 percentage
points above that for rental housing and 5percentagepoints above the
weighted average net cost for owner-occupied housing. After allowing for
the impact of the Tax Act, the net costs for corporate capital and rental
housing are equal, and that for owner-occupied housing is only three
percentagepoints less. Whenthe net cost for owner-occupied housing is
examined by income class, one sees that the net cost is significantly
belowthoseof rental housing and corporate capital for the upper-middle
and high income classes only.36
TABlE12:l'ET (OF DEPRECIATION) USER COSTS
InitialAfter the Tax Act








costs are meaBured in percentage points; that for owner-occupied
housing isa weighted average of those for the fourincome classes, the
weightsbeing their fraction of the initial stockheld.37
V. Conclusion
Ouranalysis suggests the following long-run impactsof the Economic
RecoveryAct of 1981 on the allocation of real capital. The stock of
nonresidential capital increases by 6percent,while the stock of housing
is reduced by 8percent.The latter is the result of a nearly 2 percentage
pointincrease inreal, pretax interest rates. Thehonieownership rate
declinesby almost l percentage pointsbecause the Tax Act increases
taxdepreciation for rental housingaswell as forindustrial capital.
Asa result, the stockofowner-occupied housing falls by 11 percent,
while the stock of rental housingisrelatively unaffected (the increase
in the number of renters offsetsa decline in thequantity ofrental
servicesdemanded per renter).
Corporate profit taxes fallby 60 percent;after-tax earnings rise
by25 percent; and retained earnings are up by 35percent.Household
taxes areroughly constant. Byassumption, the full decline in taxes is
tched by a decrease in government expenditures.
Some other assumptions should be emphasized. First, saving is
unchanged. Second, there are no other outputorgrowtheffects.
Thatis,resources arenotmore fullyemployed,labor participation does
notrise, and the productivity increase that should accompany the 6
percent increase in industrial capital (in spite of the increase in real
pretax interest rates) is not factored into the model. The existence of
these ttsupply side" effects would (through an increase in saving) further38
increasethe stock of industrial capital and would dampen the decline
in the stock of residential capital. In fact, residential capital could
increase, although household consumption will surelybetilted from
capital (housing and durables) services to other services.
One other result is worthy of mention. When the cut in the maximum
taxrate on unearned (capital) income is analyzed in isolation, total
household taxes on unearned income increase. The cut in the tax rate on
interestfromfully-taxed debt instruments leads high income households
to shift from riskier, tax-sheltered investments into the more heavily
taxed debt instruments. As a result, their taxes are estimated to rise by
$2 billion (l9T7 dollars). Because the decline in taxes paid by other
households is slight, total household taxes rise.39
TES
*Thismaterialisbased upon worksupportedby the National Science Foundation
underGrant No. DAR-80160611.Theresearch reported here is part of the
NBER 'a research program in Taxation and project in Capital Formation. Any
opinionsexpressed arethose of the authors and not those of the National
Bureauof Economic Research orNational ScienceFoundation. We thank
Joel Slemrod, Kevin Villani and the other participants at the Housing
Conference for their helpful conBnents.
The paper was part of a study of investment and saving sponsored by the
American Council of Life Insurance and was published in 1980.
2For analyses of these factors, see the papers in this issue by Slemrod,
Aim and Follain, and Hezidershott and Hu.
3me model draws heavily upon Slemrod 'swork(1980, 1982).
Covariances of returns are assumed to be zero.
5The tax depreciation rate is assumed to equal the economic depreciation
rate (0.10) plus 0.01 minus 0.liii. The 0.01 reflects accelerated depreciation
schedules, and the 0.4ii captures the impact ofhistoric cost depreciatiai
and FIFO inventory accounting.1o
isiq7 gross national product ($1972 billion) less housing services
($187 billion); LA is owner-occupied housingplusland associated with
it; is other residential structures times 1.25toaccount for land;
K is nonresidential plant and equipment plus land not used with housing
plus inventories; TXK is the sum of corporate profit tax liabilities and
our estimate of corporate property taxes ($21.6). These data are from
Flow of Funds (1980).
70f course, the risk premiums are endogenous in the simulations, depending
upon portfolio shares.
8The after-taxvariance ofthe returns on corporateequity andrental housing
is not affected by these changes.
9Fei1atein and Fane (1973) have provided evidence that households do pierce
the veil. Recent estimates of von Furstenberg (1981) suggest that
households offset only two-thirds of changes in corporatesaving.
10When Hendershott andRu (1981b) calculated a partial equilibrium response
of equipment demand to the 10-5-3 plan, they obtained a l1 percent increase.
They also emphasized that the general equilibrium effect would be smaller.
11Tbesedata mayunderstate the shift away from housingcapitalin that the
relativeexpected inflation rate in house(asset) prices is assumedto be
unchanged. It maybethat this relative expected inflation rate would decline
(from positive to, say,zero)in responsetothe negative impacton housing
demand of the increase in real interest rates.11.1
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